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JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY: REDRESSING VOTING
TECHNOLOGY
Candice Hoke †
Over the past decade, Ohio, California, Florida, and other states
commissioned over a dozen separate, independent scientific
assessments of their deployed or contemplated electronic voting
systems. Each published report documented grave deficiencies that
relate to these systems’ capacity to accurately record vote choices,
produce correct tallies, and function reliably and securely in other
ways that integrally relate to the right to vote. 1 The most
† Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University; Founding Director of the
Center for Election Integrity and Project Director of the Public Monitor of Cuyahoga Election
Reform (2006–08); Research Team Leader for a portion of the California Top to Bottom Review
of Voting Systems (2007); and pro bono consultant for structuring the Ohio EVEREST voting
system review. Under Public Monitor auspices, she authored or co-authored reports on election
technical security, and proposed and led Ohio’s first post-election audit of cast ballots. The
author has testified before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Administration, on
post-election auditing and before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on voting system
“incidents reporting.” In work to improve voting technologies, she works with election officials
nationally, congressional and state legislative staff of both major political parties, and with
executive office staff at federal and state levels. The author thanks Professors Richard Hasen
and Dan Tokaji, who have dedicated part of their scholarly agendas to grappling with voting
technology issues, and scientists Matt Bishop, David Jefferson, Barbara Simons, Andrew Appel,
Ron Rivest, Doug Jones, Alex Halderman, Duncan Buell, Dave Eckhardt, Jeremy Epstein, and
David Wagner, who persist in seeking resolutions to e-voting deficiencies. She also thanks
scholars in allied fields, election officials, and advocates for election operations accountability
who include Doug Kellner, Philip Stark, Mark Lindeman, Matt Damschroder, Robert Adams,
Susannah Goodman, Pam Smith, Lowell Finley, Jane Platten, Howard Stanislevic, Ellen
Theisen, Susan Greenhalgh, Luther Weeks, and Margit Johansson. Critical commentary was
generously provided by Professors Richard Hasen, George H. Taylor, and James Wilson but
errors are the author’s alone. Superb research assistance from law student Sarah Kendrig and
law librarians Amy Burchfield, Tom Hurray, and Schuyler Cook proved essential.
1 See Matt Bishop, Mark Graff, Candice Hoke, David Jefferson & Sean Peisert,
Resolving the Unexpected in Elections: Election Officials’ Options, app. 2, 22–27 (2008),
http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2008-forensic/2008-eforen.pdf
(providing
a
comprehensive listing of the studies through 2008 and links to their public reports and a guide to
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comprehensive and definitive of these studies, the California Top to
Bottom Review and the Ohio Project EVEREST assessment, each
evaluated three major voting systems in nationwide deployment. 2
Collectively, these two studies confirm prior studies’ findings
detailing significant deficiencies in the voting equipment used by over
90 percent of all American voters. 3
While information security specialists and computer scientists
have published numerous peer-reviewed articles and held conferences
devoting significant attention to these two studies, 4 rather surprisingly
no election law scholar has published a law review article that
considers the legal import of these comprehensive findings from top
scientists. 5 This stunning silence from the election law scholarly

indicators of possible electronic malfunctions and forensic assessments to determine whether the
tabulation reports deserve trust).
2 The Top to Bottom Review (“TTBR”) evaluated Diebold, Sequoia, and Hart InterCivic
branded voting systems and reports on the voting systems have been available on the Secretary
of State’s website since they were issued in August 2007. Top-to-Bottom Review, CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/top-tobottom-review.htm (last visited April 15, 2012) [hereinafter TTBR]. EVEREST studied ES&S,
Diebold, and Hart. Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security, Ohio EVEREST Voting Study,
PENN STATE UNIV., http://siis.cse.psu.edu/everest.html (last visited May 10, 2012).
3 The conservative estimate that these systems are used by 90 percent of all U.S. voters is
generated from the U.S. Department of Justice’s judicial submission of antitrust legal
documents. These reveal that the merger of the former Diebold Election Systems division
(renamed Premier Elections Solutions) with ES&S, Inc. would have concentrated control over
70 percent of the U.S. electorate in the hands of buyer ES&S. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Department Requires Key Divestiture in Election Systems & Software/Premier
Election
Solutions
Merger
(March
8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-at-235.html (reporting ES&S’ divestiture of
voting equipment system assets purchased from Premier Elections Solutions in order to restore
competition as part of a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division). By adding jurisdictions using Sequoia and Hart InterCivic systems (the third- and
fourth-largest companies), the voting systems of at least 90 percent of all voters, and more likely
95–98 percent, are embraced within these two studies. See TTBR, supra note 2 (detailing
Secretary Bowen's decisions and the independent experts' findings in the review).
4 The Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE)
is the prominent international interdisciplinary scholarly forum dedicated to voting technology
issues. It posts a call for papers every spring. Part of the USENIX Security conference
proceedings, its papers are peer–reviewed and web–published without charge. Several 2008
conference papers present scholarly versions of the reports produced in the TTBR or
EVEREST. See, e.g., Adam Aviv et al., Security Evaluation of ES&S Voting Machines and
Election
Management
System
(2008),
http://static.usenix.org/events/evt08/tech/full_papers/aviv/aviv.pdf; Kevin Butler et al., Systemic
Issues in the Hart InterCivic and Premier Voting Systems: Reflections on Project EVEREST
(2008), http://static.usenix.org/events/evt08/tech/full_papers/butler/butler.pdf. Papers published
in later EVT/WOTE conferences continue to draw on these two studies. E.g., D.A. Buell et al.,
Auditing
a
DRE–Based
Election
in
South
Carolina
(2011),
http://static.usenix.org/events/evtwote11/tech/final_files/Buell.pdf (relying on EVEREST’s
ES&S reports); Matt Bishop et al., E-Voting and Forensics: Prying Open the Black Box (2009),
http://static.usenix.org/events/evtwote09/tech/full_papers/bishop.pdf.
5 A Westlaw JLR database search identified a small number of articles citing to the
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community sharply contrasts with the profuse legal scholarship that
evaluated Bush v. Gore’s handling of punch card voting inadequacies
and the Florida presidential debacle. 6 The scholarly muteness also
differs markedly from the rapt attention accorded to campaign
finance, 7 redistricting, 8 and voter registration cum voter fraud. 9

TTBR and EVEREST, but none, however, has been authored by an election law scholar who
assessed the import of these findings with regard to the constitutional standards for the right to
vote. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 358
(recommending open source software for mission–critical governmental activities including
voting); Brian J. Miller, The Right to Participate, the Right to Know, and Electronic Voting in
Montana, 69 MONT. L. REV. 371, 390 (2008) (concluding that Montana law proscribes the use
of unauditable voting systems). Daniel Tokaji is one of the few election legal scholars who
considered the legal import of early scientific voting system studies. See generally Daniel P.
Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1711 (2005) [hereinafter Electronic Voting and Democratic Values] (providing an overview of
the transformation of the voting process’s recent emphasis on electronic voting and from both a
legal and policy perspective). Tokaji has not yet reassessed his early approach in light of the
much more comprehensive, definitive studies from California and Ohio, and in light of the
experiential record amassed by these e-voting technologies. This Article seeks in part to garner
Tokaji’s revisiting of voting technology legal questions in light of the materials and arguments
advanced here. Book treatments, however, address some of these issues. E.g., RICHARD HASEN,
THE VOTING WARS (2012) (including a chapter on voting technology disputes). Election Law
casebooks, however, thus far exclude attention to these definitive studies and their import for
election law values.
6 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 1006
(2007)(exploring the continuing value and legal issues posed by the seminal case, including
appropriate constitutional standards of review for election administration issues); Richard L.
Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L REV. 1 (2007) (lamenting the
decision’s import in election administration); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003
TermForeword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 49
(2004); Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v.
Gore. 82 B.U. L. REV. 609 (2002) (reconsidering the constitutionality of Supreme Court
intruding into a presidential election as occurred in 2000). Rick Hasen helpfully inventoried
Bush scholarship through 2004. Richard L. Hasen, A Critical Guide to Bush v. Gore
Scholarship, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297, 301–04 (2004).
7 E.g., Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and
Wisconsin Right To Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867 (2011) (exploring the continuing viability of campaign finance
regulation via tax law); Allison R. Hayward, What Changes Do Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Require For Federal Campaign Finance Statutes And Regulations?, 44 IND. L. REV.
285 (2010) (examining recent Court rulings on the Federal Election Campaign Act and state
statutes); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010) (critically
evaluating corruption as a justification for campaign finance regulation); Justin Levitt,
Confronting The Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217 (2011) (reviewing
the line of cases that led to Citizens United and contending that the notorious case was a small
step from prior precedent); Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of
Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147 (2004) (mapping the changes in campaign
finance jurisprudence in the post-Clinton era).
8 E.g., Steven F. Huefner, Don't Just Make Redistricters More Accountable to the People,
Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 37 (2010) (discussing the
“practical possibility of designing an apolitical redistricting process”); Samuel Issacharoff &
Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Partisan Gerrymanders, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 541, 555 (2004); Nathaniel Persily, The Law of The Census: How to Count, What to
Count, Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755 (2011) (providing
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Election law scholars recognize that each of these constellations of
issues offer rich opportunities for partisan gaming and tools for
structurally insulating incumbents from meaningful election contests.
As such, they pose serious risks to realizing the constitutional promise
of popular sovereignty. 10 Yet, if each of these issues were resolved in
a hypothetically ideal manner but the voting technology status quo
remained uncorrected, the individual and aggregated right to vote
would be seriously threatened, with federal elections potentially
transformed into mere theatre.
This Article seeks to rally legal scholars with election law
expertise to dedicate a portion of their considerable intellectual
firepower to legal questions raised by problematic voting
technologies. After minority undervote rates and disability
accessibility issues appeared to have been solved, or at least far better
managed by newer computer-based technologies, 11 almost all election

an overview of the laws regulating the census); Pildes, supra note 6, at 55–83; Michael J. Pitts,
Redistricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1579 (2010) (proposing a
new model for the Court to use when examining discrimination in the context of redistricting).
9 E.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 644 (2008)
(hypothesizing the Court will soon abandon its long–held “individual rights” and “no theory”
precepts); Edward B. Foley & Bradley A. Smith, Voter ID: What's At Stake?, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 241 (2007); Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted
Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97 (2012) (arguing new voter regulations are
unwarranted and will re-open the gap between the demographics of those who vote and the
population as a whole); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 657–63
(2007) (exploring the scope and potential impact of photographic identification requirements for
voting); Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in The Supreme Court's Recent Election
Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 89 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election
Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1206, 1233 (2005) (examining federal election administrative issues that resulted in
disenfranchisement in Ohio and elsewhere, and the federal remedial statute); Hans A. von
Spakovsky, Protecting the Integrity of the Election Process, 11 ELECTION L.J. 90 (2012)
(arguing in favor of photographic identification requirements as an integrity component).
10 Popular sovereignty is directly referenced in the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4 (providing that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government”). See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
276–80 (2006) (explaining “the essence of the Article IV guarantee of each state's ‘Republican’
form of government” as “to shore up popular sovereignty”); Kathryn Abrams, No “There”
There: State Autonomy and Voting Rights Regulation, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 835 (1994)
(explaining Guarantee Clause’s interpretive meaning in the voting rights context); Michael W.
McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 106–107 (2000) (contending the “Republican Form of Government
Clause is a structural or institutional guarantee, emphasizing the right of ‘the People’–the
majority–to ultimate political authority.”). One, therefore, might contend that the structural
aspects of the right to vote are represented in the Guarantee Clause far better than the Equal
Protection Clause. See Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54
DUKE L.J. 1457, 1484 (2005) (suggesting that Baker “may be viewed as presenting a Guarantee
Clause claim in disguise . . . .”).
11 See HAVA, infra notes 23, 27 (compelling “notice voting”). The Brennan Center for
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legal scholars apparently lost interest in voting technology
questions. 12 But the scientific studies raise new bases for questioning
not only whether these underserved communities’ needs are met by
the deployed technologies, but also whether the well-meant electronic
cure 13 for Floridian punch card irregularities has led to dramatically
more serious legal issues.
The Supreme Court has frequently delineated the fundamental
right to vote as including the right to have vote choices correctly
recorded, counted as they were cast, and correctly reported in the final
tally. 14 While its ballot box-stuffing cases repeatedly underscore these
subsidiary steps as integral to the right to vote,15 these cases and their
principles generally do not surface in lower court opinions
adjudicating the constitutional sufficiency of challenged e-voting
technology. This omission warrants correction, and the principles
thereby rescued will assist courts in applying the correct standard of
review. If the constellation of voting systems and operating
procedures permits covert, untraceable electronic ballot box-stuffing,
the constitutional commitment is not realized and should be
actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment Republic-protecting
strict scrutiny review. 16

Justice concluded that voting technology improvements post–HAVA had significantly reduced
the undervote and overvote rates of minority voters. Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice,
Brennan Center Report Finds Improvements in New Voting Technology Being Implemented in
Several
States
(Aug.
28,
2006),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/brennan_center_report_finds_improvements_in
_new_voting_technology_being_imp. Whether voting participation barriers for voters with
disabilities have been resolved is particularly disputed. The TTBR assessed the actual real-world
success of supposedly accessible technologies for disabled voters and finding them lacking, see
infra text accompanying notes 79–82.
12 The few notable exceptions include election law scholars Richard Hasen, Heather
Gerken, and Dan Tokaji. See infra notes 106, 113–15. In the allied field of political science, a
Cal Tech/MIT Voting Technology Project scholar notes, “voting technology has been an orphan
in political science since the creation of the profession, as it has also been for its sister
profession, public administration. Lack of sustained research on voting technologies has
paralleled lack of attention more generally to issues of election administration and its effects on
election outcomes.” Charles Stewart III, Voting Technology, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 353, 372
(2011). Election Law is obviously a third such field that has omitted sustained attention to
election technologies.
13 In this Article, “e-voting,” “electronic voting” and “computer-based voting” are used
interchangeably to embrace all types of computer-based voting systems. These include optical
scanners, direct recording electronic (DRE) touchscreens, and Internet systems, and even
embrace the discredited punch card systems.
14 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
208 (1962); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
15 See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) and cases infra note 87.
16 Thus far, the Court has not combined an understanding of cyber security threats with
the realities of current voting technologies.
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My analysis seeks to underscore the gravity of technologically
threatened constitutional voting rights and values, implicating both
individual rights to vote and the structural promise of popular
sovereignty. Resolution of the dispute over the meaning of Fourteenth
Amendment 17 principles properly derived from Bush v. Gore 18 will be
pivotal to assuring meaningful voting rights in the information
society. If the Court should hold the Fourteenth Amendment to
embrace a deferential standard of review or arduous intent
requirements, allowing state political branches to persist in choosing
voting technologies based on scientifically unfounded premises that
do not achieve classic components of voting rights, the American
Republic’s future is seriously endangered. 19
The argument proceeds in two parts. Part I traces illustrative
empirical findings of the two comprehensive, definitive voting
systems studies, offers evidence derived from actual election
calamities that substantiates the experts’ findings, and translates these
findings into concepts meaningful for voting rights and election law.
Part II considers the judiciary’s failures thus far to understand the
legal import of the scientific studies of voting systems when
adjudicating the structural legal sufficiency of deployed voting
systems 20 and identifies questions on which scholarship is critically
needed. Throughout, owing to space constraints, the argument is
illustrative rather than comprehensive.

17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (supporting Equal Protection and Substantive Due
Process claims).
18 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
19 Thus, this Article contends that courts’ rulings in constitutional challenges to DREs that
lacked a software-independent record of the voters’ selections failed to understand the import of
the security studies for the fundamental right to vote. Each of the earlier courts used a sliding
scale or balancing test rather than strict scrutiny, and indulged a preference to defer to the
political branches in the choice of voting systems. E.g., Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106
(9th Cir. 2003), Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006), Tex. Democratic
Party v. Williams, 285 F. App’x 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
912 (2009); Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1,12 (Tex. 2011).
20 Part II draws in part on the analytic approach and legal policy recommendations of
three noted election legal scholars: Richard Hasen, Heather Gerken, and Dan Tokaji. Although
their scholarly work to date has not responded to the comprehensive, definitive scientific studies
of voting technology, these academics depart from the field’s scholarly norm by characterizing
voting technology as a central problem for election law and voting rights. My future work will
draw on Hasen, Gerken, and Tokaji in greater depth. Owing to space constraints, this Article
limits its concern to structural constitutional litigation external to an election contest. Hence, it
does not directly consider candidate challenges to counts or claims for recounts.
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I. THE SCIENTIFIC AND PERFORMANCE RECORD RELEVANT TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SUFFICIENCY OF DEPLOYED VOTING SYSTEMS
Problematic voting devices that produced ambiguous vote totals
and inconsistent recounts famously triggered the U.S. Supreme
Court’s intercession into Florida’s 2000 presidential election
tabulation. 21 In response to Bush v. Gore 22 and the resulting public
furor, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(“HAVA”). 23 Its statutory standards requiring that voters be allowed
to correct balloting errors before casting a ballot virtually mandated
the replacement of existing voting devices with new computer-based
voting. 24 Most states moved from punch cards or lever systems in
2004–05 after receiving an allotment from the $3 billion in federal
monies designed to incentivize the change. 25 The first scientific
assessments of the software and security features in the new voting
systems that were conducted independent of the manufacturers
occurred in 2003 and 2004. 26 In 2007, after the earlier studies had
identified grave deficiencies, the California and Ohio Secretaries of
State convened definitive, multi-system studies with teams of
prominent computer scientists and other experts from across the
nation. This Part briefly reviews the findings in these two major
studies and offers some illustrative examples of how these
documented flaws affect real elections.
A. The Comprehensive, Definitive Voting Systems Reviews
HAVA provided substantial financial incentives for states to
replace their existing punch card and lever voting systems, but it
required new systems to satisfy specified functional criteria. 27 These
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Id.
23 The Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2006) [hereinafter
HAVA].
24 HAVA § 15481(a)(1)(A). The punch card systems were not simply mechanical but also
included computer components. See ROY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING
TECHNOLOGY: IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 160–69 (2006).
25 See HAVA §§ 15301–05 (authorizing payments to State governments); Tova Wang,
Competing Values or False Choices: Coming to Consensus on the Election Reform Debate in
Washington State and the Country, 29 SEATTLE U.L. REV 353, 355 (2005) (reporting that $3.1
billion had been allocated to states for election improvements by 2005).
26 In 2003, the Ohio Secretary of State contracted with consultant Compuware to assess
the four major vendors’ DRE touchscreen voting systems. See COMPUWARE CORPORATION,
DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC (“DRE”) TECHNICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT (2003)
[hereinafter COMPUWARE] (publishing the public report). The Maryland legislature convened
the RABA scientific study. RABA TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, TRUSTED AGENT REPORT: DIEBOLD
ACCUVOTE-TS VOTING SYSTEM (2004) [hereinafter RABA study].
27 HAVA’s § 15302 mandates voting system compliance with functional specifications
21
22

37

1004

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4

requirements included provision of notice to the voter of errors such
as “overvoting” a race by marking too many choices, 28 so that the
voter might correct any errors before the ballot is cast. To satisfy
notice or “second chance” voting and other requirements, HAVA led
states to authorize purchases of three kinds of voting systems: 29
optical scanners for reading paper ballots,30 direct recording
electronic (“DRE”) machines that normally offer a touch screen for
marking electronic ballot choices, and computerized ballot-marking
devices designed primarily for disability access. Each system’s
software generates the electronic ballot “styles” or “definitions” 31 by
assembling the election data so that it can be printed (for optical scan
ballots) or copied to memory media for display on DRE voting
devices. 32 The software later tabulates and reports the election totals
from both types of voting devices into one election results report.
California’s Secretary of State, Debra Bowen, contracted the Top
to Bottom Review (“TTBR”) to the University of California shortly
after she was inaugurated in 2007. The project was led and staffed by
nationally recognized computer scientists, of whom a number of had
amassed high-profile voting systems forensic experience in
problematic elections. The TTBR evaluated three proprietary voting
systems—Diebold, Hart, and Sequoia systems—that were deployed
not only in California, but also nationwide with only minor
differences. 33 Its scientists discovered both serious engineering and
coding errors (software “bugs”) as well as security design and coding

that include those detailed in § 15481(a)(1)(A), requiring an opportunity for voter verification of
ballot choices before the ballot is cast, and an opportunity to change ballot choices and be
notified of any overvotes, with an option to correct the ballot before it is cast. The mandatory
minimum statutory standards for voting systems also specify a manual audit capacity on a
permanent paper record, § 15481(a)(2)(B), and the maximum error rate permitted by a voting
system, § 15481(a)(5)(B).
28 HAVA § 15481(a)(1)(A)(iii).
29 HAVA defines a “voting system” at § 15481(b) in expansive terms.
30 Optical scanners include portable, low-capacity, precinct-based models and high-speed,
high-capacity, centralized scanning units.
31 In some states, such as Ohio, ballot rotation rules produce the need for a different ballot
in every precinct. See CUYAHOGA ELECTION REVIEW PANEL: FINAL REPORT (2006) (reporting
that the county required almost 7,000 separate ballot styles in the failed election). In federal
primaries, ballot rotation and separate party ballots can lead to five or more ballot styles per
precinct, placing a huge burden on staff.
32 A DRE is a voting unit that digitally records voters’ choices. The current generation of
DREs tends to feature a touch screen as the mechanism on which voters indicate their choices,
theoretically translated into electronic signals that enter votes into the electronic “buckets” for
each candidate consistent with each voter’s choices. Some DREs print an “audit trail” on
spooled paper.
33 The TTBR did not review the ES&S systems, but California convened a different
review. See TTBR, supra note 2 (linking to ES&S material under the Election Systems and
Software heading).
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errors, all of which can manifest in reporting false vote tallies or in
rendering the system unavailable for voters’ use. 34
Software constitutes a critical component of these digital election
systems. It provides instructions to a computer that include
delineation of the functions to perform, their order of operation, what
audit logs will be maintained, and many others. In a database program
like that used in voting systems, software creates the “buckets” within
which votes will be “deposited” or recorded in humanly unreadable
language. The buckets for each candidate and question on the ballot
must be properly mapped to a “button” or an oval that the voter uses
to identify vote choices. The voter’s selections must be translated by a
chain of electronic interactions into records kept in electronic buckets,
which are thereafter copied and interpreted by a chain of additional
electronic transactions until ultimately reported as cast vote reports in
humanly comprehensible language. Computer science and
engineering experts stress that election officials and voters have no
method by which to determine whether all steps in this electronic
chain have been completed correctly. 35 The accountability
functionality available through automatic logging can assist in
identifying transaction errors if engineered appropriately, but would
require the systems’ designs to incorporate rigorous monitoring and
self-reporting of errors, and also protections for the auditing functions
so their data cannot be erased or disabled. 36 The content of the
34 Bugs can introduce system instability and failures, also known as “access” issues, in
addition to security issues. See, e.g., Matt Blaze et al., Source Code Review of the Sequoia
Voting System 33, 41 (2007), http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/ttbr/sequoiasource-public-jul26.pdf (noting that “[c]omplex software systems are especially susceptible to
bugs or errors that cause the system to behave in an unintended manner. When one of these bugs
is encountered, the effect can vary from causing minor instability to enabling devastating
security exploits . . . . [Exacerbations of software bugs] will be detrimental to the system’s
reliability and usability”).
35 See, e.g., Thomas Ryan and Candice Hoke, GEMS Tabulation Database Design Issues
in Relation to Voting Systems Certification Standards, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
USENIX/ACCURATE ELECTRONIC VOTING TECHNOLOGY WORKSHOP (2007) (reporting
design and engineering errors that can affect the accuracy of election results). Both TTBR and
EVEREST confirmed the conclusions of this paper. EVEREST: EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
OF ELECTION-RELATED EQUIPMENT, STANDARDS, AND TESTING § 13.1.1 (2007) [hereinafter
EVEREST FINAL REPORT]; UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, SOURCE CODE REVIEW OF
THE DIEBOLD VOTING SYSTEM § 5.3.1 (2007), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/votingsystems/oversight/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf [hereinafter UC SOURCE CODE REVIEW].
While no feasible method allows election officials and voters to ascertain the correctness of
each component step in the electronic cascade of e-voting system communication, robust postelection auditing permits effective checks on the final results—which may suffice for the critical
needs of election officials and voters. See infra text accompanying notes 156–63.
36 Election officials in Humboldt County, California, discovered a logging design failure
in the Diebold GEMS tabulation software when physical ballot totals did not match the software
record. The officials found that the audit log failed to provide a record of ballot batch files that
the officials had deleted when they suspected an error. Kim Zetter, Serious Error in Diebold
Voting Software Caused Lost Ballots in California County–Update, WIRED (Dec. 8, 2008, 2:32
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automatic logging must also be designed not to contain data that
could compromise the anonymity and secrecy of the ballot.
Software “bugs” or coding errors and engineering choices can be
analyzed separately with regard to performance stability and
functionality. Serious bugs can result in a failure of the system to
function correctly, or at all. As the Sequoia examiners wrote:
“Complex software systems are especially susceptible to bugs or
errors that cause the system to behave in an unintended manner.
When one of these bugs is encountered, the effect can vary from
causing minor instability to enabling devastating security exploits.” 37
The most troubling security flaws TTBR researchers discovered
lay at the level of baseline, elementary computer security. These
mistakes were blatant violations of the most settled, foundational
principles of security software design and “robust” programming. The
researchers concluded that the software of all systems lacked basic
security protections. All systems failed to follow standard security
design principles. All systems were susceptible to viruses that could
be introduced from a number of vectors, including from voting device
memory cards. These design defects offered hundreds (if not
thousands) of different opportunities in every election for inserting
programming code that would “flip” votes among candidates,
scramble tabulation data, delete voting data, provide “back doors” for
remote tampering, or cause system programming to fail. 38
Information systems design precepts for vital data where accuracy
and security rank as preeminent objectives include structuring and
rigorously protecting audit logs so they will automatically record all
operator activity. In the election context, this design feature would
allow for the monitoring of all tabulation activity, including any effort
to delete or substitute vote data. HAVA specifies that voting systems
shall have an “audit capacity” without supplying details of the

PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/12/unique-election/. Zetter quotes a software
specialist: “This means the audit log is not truly a ‘log’ in the classical computer program sense,
but is rather a ‘re-imagining’ of what GEMS would like the audit log to be, based on whatever
information GEMS happens to remember at the end of the vote counting process.” Id. After the
election officials reported the problem to the California Secretary of State, the vendor
summarily terminated its contract with the county. See Parke Bostrom, Disclosed:
Diebold/Premier's Humboldt County Termination Letters, THE BRAD BLOG (Apr. 30, 2009,
4:32 PM), http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7109#more-7109 (displaying the Diebold contract
termination letters).
37 Blaze et al., supra note 34, at 33.
38 See UC Source Code Team Reports & UC Red Team Reports for Diebold/Premier,
Sequoia, and Hart InterCivic, TTBR, supra note 2, (documenting the final reports from the
University of California scientists detailing their findings from the top-to-bottom review).
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required features. 39 Perhaps not surprisingly, the studies found that
the voting systems’ logs that recorded operator activity had failed to
satisfy industry standard design protections to prevent their accidental
or intentional overwriting or erasure.40 In a banking environment,
logs constitute records that will “report” attempts to transfer funds
and thus act as a deterrent of illegal conduct. In the voting arena,
failure to protect the logs means that motivated “insiders” could
manipulate voting data and results, and then erase the log inventories
that would show their identity and activity inside the tabulation
database. Or, the opportunity could be used to frame a different
employee for nefarious conduct.
All voting systems’ “election management” software failed to
maintain minimally adequate system access controls, as they
permitted relatively easy bypassing of passwords. Many other
security holes existed in each system that easily permitted the voting
system to be compromised in ways that could prevent the system’s
ability to report accurate election results—or any results.
The TTBR also included an expert accessibility team 41 strictly
dedicated to assessing all three voting systems for their usability and
accessibility for voters with physical disabilities or alternate language
needs. 42 Although vendors marketed many of these DRE systems as
satisfying legal requirements for physical accessibility, usability
HAVA § 15481(a)(2).
Some of the Diebold/Premier voting systems not only lacked protection of audit logs
but also provided a “clear” button for permanently erasing the audit log. See Kim Zetter, Report:
Diebold Voting System Has ‘Delete’ Button for Erasing Audit Logs, WIRED, (Mar. 3, 2009, 4:30
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/ca-report-finds (reporting on the California
Secretary of State’s investigation and conclusion that the button violates HAVA: “the Clear
buttons … allow inadvertent or malicious destruction of critical audit trail records in all Gems
version 1.18.19 jurisdictions, risking the accuracy and integrity of elections conducted using this
voting system”).
41 The California Secretary of State described the accessibility consultants:
39
40

The accessibility of the voting systems will be assessed by a single team of two
accessibility experts, headed by Noel Runyan of Campbell, California. Mr. Runyan
is an electrical engineer and computer scientist with over 33 years experience in
design and manufacturing of access technology systems for people with disabilities.
For the last four years, he has concentrated on the accessibility of voting systems.
The accessibility assessment will include test voting on each of the voting systems
by volunteer voters representing a broad range of disabilities.
News Release, Debra Bowen California Secretary of State, Frequently Asked Questions
About Secretary of State Debra Bowen’s Top–To–Bottom Review of California’s Voting
System (June 13, 2007), http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/ttbr/ttbr-q-and-a061307.pdf.
42 NOEL RUNYAN AND JIM TOBIAS, ACCESSIBILITY REVIEW REPORT FOR CALIFORNIA
TOP–TO–BOTTOM VOTING SYSTEMS REVIEW 1 (2007) (explaining that the authors evaluated
“usability and accessibility for voters with disabilities and voters with alternate language needs,
using both heuristic and user testing techniques”).
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testing demonstrated that the DRE systems could not accommodate
most individuals with disabilities. 43 For instance, physical access by
wheelchair-bound individuals could often not be achieved because of
design features. 44 Audio ballot functions for visually impaired voters
proved unwieldy for the target voters.45 The authors concluded that
“none met the accessibility requirements of current law and none
performed satisfactorily in test voting by persons with a range of
disabilities and alternate language needs.”46 The California Secretary
of State responded by mandating many managerial and technical
modifications to the DREs as a condition of their continued use.47
Recalling that these same DREs are widely deployed nationwide
under the presumption they satisfy requirements for “accessible”
voting systems, the larger legal question may be why no litigation or
other decertification proceedings have occurred elsewhere.
Developing these crucial legal underpinnings is a task needing the
assistance of election law scholars concerned with underserved
communities.48
After publication of the TTBR reports in August, the Ohio
EVEREST study commenced, with most work occurring during the
fall of 2007. 49 Its methodology differed somewhat in that the state
43 Id. Fortunately, the experts were able to generate a list of modifications (“mitigations”)
that could allow the systems to become accessible and fully usable to most of the targeted
voters, but configured as marketed, they legally failed compliance assessments. Id. at 30–35.
The experts wrote they could describe “possible improvements to the concerns . . . . All of these
options are actions that could readily be taken by poll workers or other election officials, or by
manufacturers, using materials and techniques we believe they may have at hand.” Id at 30.
44 Id. at 6–12.
45 Id. at 20–23.
46 Id. at 1.
47 The Secretary’s DRE orders predominantly focused on narrowing the security gaps and
reducing the number of voters who would cast ballots on these devices. She also required a 100
percent hand recount of all ballots cast on the DREs, using the VVPAT (Voter-Verified Paper
Audit Trail) in separate orders addressed to each voting system. See, e.g., STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, SECRETARY OF STATE, WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL OF DIEBOLD ELECTION
SYSTEMS, INC., GEMS .18.24/ACCUVOTE-TSWACCUVOTE-OS DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING
SYSTEM AND CONDITIONAL RE-APPROVAL OF USE OF DIEBOLD ELECTION SYSTEMS, INC.,
GEMS 1.18.24/ACCUVOTE-TSX/ACCUVOTE-OS DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING SYSTEM 5
(2007) (specifying that “[t]he jurisdiction must conduct a 100% manual tally, by the process
described in Elections Code section 15360, of all votes cast on an AccuVote-TSx [Diebold
DRE]”).
48 Two Ohio State University legal scholars have shown significant interest in accessible
voting, see Daniel P. Tokaji & Ruth Colker, Absentee Voting by People with Disabilities:
Promoting Access and Integrity, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1015 (2007). But their article’s scope
excludes precinct-based voting. Tokaji addressed these questions in a separate article that
preceded the TTBR’s findings. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and
Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711 (2005).
49 A number of the TTBR scientists, including team leaders Matt Blaze and Giovanni
Vigna, also led parts of the EVEREST work but under slightly different contractual
arrangements and with a substantially lengthier research period. EVEREST could thus
effectively build upon the TTBR. See EVEREST FINAL REPORT, supra note 35 (explaining that
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contract convened three separate teams from different sectors: one
academic team, 50 one private security consultant firm, 51 and one
voting system testing laboratory. 52 One key contribution lay in its
comprehensive evaluation of the ES&S voting systems. 53 A second
difference lay in the security consulting firm’s development of a
yardstick or grading metric of twelve criteria that reflected the
industry’s standard best practices where security was a major
objective; the firm scored each voting system with simply a pass or
fail on each criterion. 54
Like the TTBR, EVEREST identified systematically a wide range
of defects and vulnerabilities that could be used to subvert accurate
election counts in undetectable and untraceable ways. 55 They found
this conclusion valid for ES&S’s voting system as well, which had
been omitted from the TTBR assessments. The EVEREST teams
discovered that ES&S voting systems paralleled other vendors for
they had not been designed in accordance with industry standards for
data accuracy and security, and lacked both robust code and
compliance with accessibility standards. The researchers underscored
that ES&S systems could not be distinguished from the other
problematic voting systems, “exhibited a visible lack of trustworthy

the analyses were conducted between October 1, 2007 and December 7, 2007, and listing Matt
Blaze and Giovanni Vigna as team leaders). This author assisted the Ohio Secretary of State’s
office and the academic teams in planning the studies and in educating the researchers on
election law and processes.
50 The EVEREST academic team’s leadership was provided by Professor Patrick
McDaniel of Pennsylvania State University. Id.
51 MicroSolved, Inc., of Columbus, Ohio, conducted a broad range of security
assessments. See OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, EVEREST PROJECT, ES&S SYSTEM MICROSOLVED, INC.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT (2007) (examining the security of the electronic voting systems
in Ohio).
52 Certified as a voting system testing laboratory, SysTest Labs conducted an assessment
of eleven counties’ written security policies but did not assess compliance with policies in real
elections, as had originally been envisioned. See STATE OF OHIO, SEC’Y OF STATE, CONSULTING
AND TESTING SERVICES RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY OF OHIO VOTING SYSTEMS, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2007) (assessing State of Ohio certified voting systems) and author’s planning notes
(on file with author).
53 See EVEREST FINAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 27–98 (evaluating the ability of the
ES&S voting systems to conduct trustworthy elections). Corporate delay tactics had
successfully excluded the ES&S systems from TTBR review. Despite receiving commitments to
participate in the TTBR from all four vendors of California-certified voting systems, only three
(Sequoia, Diebold (now Dominion), and Hart InterCivic) complied with the project’s calendar
sufficiently to be reviewed. See TTBR, supra note 2 (listing the voting systems that were
reviewed and providing links to the reviews).
54 OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, JENNIFER L. BRUNNER, PROJECT EVEREST: EVALUATION AND
VALIDATION OF ELECTION RELATED EQUIPMENT, STANDARDS AND TESTING 15 (2007)
[hereinafter EVEREST EXECUTIVE REPORT].
55 See EVEREST FINAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 3–4 (describing the security failures
present in the studied systems).
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auditing capability.” 56 Activity logs could easily be forged or erased
by those individuals whose activity was “intended to be monitor[ed],”
with the cumulative import that “it is difficult to know when an attack
occurs, or to know how to isolate or recover from it when it is
detected.” 57
EVEREST and TTBR thus clarified and reinforced four critical
points germane to evaluating the legal sufficiency of deployed voting
systems. All of the voting systems that are in wide deployment
nationally are pervaded with software design and coding errors that
can randomly cause vote loss, miscounts, or other voting device
malfunctions. In legal terms, they can function in an arbitrary and
capricious manner with no demonstrable evidence of such errors. 58
Second, all of the systems pervasively provide opportunities for
deliberate covert tampering with all aspects of an election’s
processes, including the tabulation reports of winners and losers;
these intrusions can also be achieved by remote connections. 59 Third,
all systems afford efficient and relatively complete ways for a
motivated individual to cover one’s tracks by deleting or modifying
the logs, thus additionally providing a relatively effective cover for
nefarious activities. Fourth, mitigations cannot be devised to
eliminate all or most of the opportunities to tamper; the failure of
designing for security at the outset cannot be overcome by managerial
practices or software patches. 60
This conclusion that the deployed voting system software has not
been engineered to and cannot consistently and reliably achieve high
accuracy in core functions finds additional support from the “twelvestep baseline comparison framework” of the industry standard best
practices. When measured against these twelve basic standards, the
Id. at 3.
Id.
58 Consider the Court’s comment in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (per
curiam): “Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later
arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” While computer
forensic experts may be able to determine whether errors occurred and with what impact on vote
recording or tallies, most election officials lack such expertise.
59 The 2011 Venango County, PA forensic audit found that an unauthorized remote
connection to the ES&S tabulation sever occurred multiple times in the election cycle, a
connection that was unknown and unreported to the election officials until the forensic
specialists filed their report. See David A. Eckhardt, Audit Analysis of the Venango County 2011
Municipal
Primary
15
(2011),
http://bradblog.com/Docs/VenangoCounty_InitialReport_DavidEckhardt_111511.pdf
(discussing the use of a remote-access application).
60 See infra text accompanying note 156–63 for discussion of a methodology that allows
cost-effective, feasible checks on vote totals (external to evaluating the correctness or integrity
of software code), and strong possibilities for reconstructing accurate totals despite bug-infected
or deliberately modified vote totals. These rigorous auditing approaches can thus permit aging, ,
problematic voting systems to continue to be deployed rather than replaced.
56
57
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EVEREST professional security consultants discovered that all of the
voting systems fell well below reasonable engineering expectations.
They concluded Premier and Hart InterCivic “scored a ‘zero,’” that is,
the Premier and Hart InterCivic voting systems “failed to meet any of
the twelve basic best practices requirements.”61 ES&S scored one out
of twelve points. 62 Qualified security experts, with knowledge of both
the industry’s engineering standards and the tools for diagnosing
problems, have engaged in comprehensive evaluations of electronic
voting systems; they have counseled the public and election officials
that without other corrections and quality assurance steps,63 these
machines are unfit for voting.
The TTBR Red Team Summary unequivocally concluded their
testing had “demonstrated that the security mechanisms provided for
all systems analyzed were inadequate to ensure accuracy and
integrity of the election results and of the systems that provide those
results.” 64 The EVEREST academic researchers’ ultimate conclusion
stressed: “All of the studied systems possess critical security failures
that render [them] insufficient to guarantee a trustworthy election.”65
These conclusions underscore that the vote totals may be accurate—
or may be partially or grossly inaccurate—because the systems’ core
operations may be impaired by software bugs, deliberate tampering,
or inadvertent errors at any of multiple levels.
When the TTBR and EVEREST studies were published, voting
system vendors (joined by some election officials) sought to dismiss
the scientific findings as contrived in an ivory tower laboratory
setting remote from real world conditions. 66 As the next section
addresses, the vendors also advanced the empirically false claim that
EVEREST EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 54, at 22, 32.
Id. at 28.
63 See infra text accompanying notes 156–57, for a discussion of how voting equipment
that is controlled by flawed software can still be used to achieve accurate election results; see
also P.B. Stark & D.A. Wagner, Evidence–Based Elections 6 (forthcoming Oct. 2012),
available at http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/evidenceVote12.pdf (arguing for the
use of software-independent voting systems and robust post-election audits).
64 MATT BISHOP, OVERVIEW OF RED TEAM REPORTS (emphasis added).
65 EVEREST FINAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 3 (emphasis added).
66 See, e.g., Letter from Steve Weir, President, Cal. Assoc. of Clerks and Election
Officials, to Top-to-Bottom Review Pub. Hearing (July 30, 2007), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/ttbr/archive/comments/caceo.pdf
(criticizing
the testing used in the Top-to-Bottom Review); Press Release, Sequoia Voting Sys., Response
from Sequoia Voting Sys. to the Cal. Sec’y of State’s Office on the Top-to-Bottom Review of
Voting
Sys.
(July
30,
2007),
available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/votingsystems/oversight/ttbr/archive/comments/sequoia.pdf (arguing that the Top–to–Bottom Review
suffered from faulty methodology); Press Release, Premier Election Solutions, Premier
Technical Response to the Ohio Everest Report (Mar. 2008), available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/everest/premierResponse.pdf (criticizing the EVEREST
study’s approach).
61
62
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no proof had established any successful attacks against an electronic
voting system. 67 The vendors did not disclose, however, that their
procurement contracts routinely included clauses barring independent
forensic assessments of election databases and the voting equipment,
and that many claimed proprietary ownership of the election data that
had been processed by their software. 68 Thus, the vendors have
67 A spokesperson for the Premier/Diebold system responded to EVEREST, claiming, “It
is important to note . . . that there has not been a single documented case of a successful attack
against an electronic voting system, in Ohio or anywhere in the United States.” Bob Driehaus,
Ohio Elections Official Calls Machines Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at A14.
While the vendors and many election officials repeated this claim of no successful attack,
it arguably is false. As just one example, in the 2006 general election, the Public Monitor of
Cuyahoga Election Reform (appointed by the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and the
County Commissioners) collected substantial circumstantial evidence of malfeasance in the
Board of Elections (BOE). See Memorandum from Candice Hoke, CSU Ctr. for Election
Integrity, to the Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections Bd. Members 9–20 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.urban.csuohio.edu/cei/public_monitor/Monitor-CCBOELegalCompliance1-8-07MEMO-FINAL.pdf (identifying areas of legal noncompliance). Specifically, after the BOE
spent two days scanning absentee ballots, a cable to the tabulation server that had been
disconnected (as required by the security policy) mysteriously was re-connected after the server
room had been locked and the personnel had supposedly left the building for the evening. The
Windows event logs and the Diebold GEMS security logs reflecting this overnight period (when
the room supposedly had been locked) suddenly did not match. The system clock inexplicably
gained eleven hours; the Windows logs showed seven print commands of the absentee ballot
tabulations in the off-hours, before Election Day and thus were arguably illegal. All BOE
personnel accessing the server used an undifferentiated “admin” default password in violation of
the security policy, which eliminated the capacity to track individual activity at the server or
from a remote location. The Monitor commented:

[T]he prohibition on generating reports of absentee voting results prior to the
close of the polls on election day [rests in concerns that] early access to absentee
vote tabulations could be used to compromise the fairness and results of the voting
on election day. For instance, absentee voting results could be used to determine
which precincts to disrupt on Election Day or to steer other forms of tampering. This
concern is especially acute where the proportion of the votes cast by absentee ballot
is extremely high, such as was the case in the November, 2006 election in which
nearly 25% of votes were cast via absentee ballot.
Id. at 13 (as full disclosure, this author served as Project Director of the Monitor and wrote
the report quoted above); see also Motion for Reconsideration, In re Venango Cnty. Election
Bd., No. 219–2011 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 2, 2011) (requesting continuation of forensic audit
into Unity/ES&S election tabulation irregularities that included multiple candidates with zero
votes and the presence of a program that permitted remote computers to log into the tabulation
server that had been used multiple times in periods near election tabulations—a profound and
heretofore hidden access point that could have eviscerated the county voters’ election choices).
David Eckhardt’s preliminary forensic report reviews the methodology and evidence obtained.
Eckhardt, supra note 59; see also Brad Friedman, Special Report: Forensic Analysis Finds
Venango County, Pa E-Voting System “Remotely Accessed” on “Multiple Occasions” by
Unknown
Computer,
THE
BRAD
BLOG
(Dec.
12,
2011,
2:11
PM),
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=8986#more-8986 (reporting background events and vendor
ES&S’s efforts to stop the forensic review). In 2010, the Libertarian Party challenged the
structural lack of transparency and accountability of the local election office and its alleged use
of Diebold software to tamper with election results. The Party won the right to proceed to trial
on its claims. Ford v. Pima Cnty. Comm. of the Ariz. Libertarian Party, Inc., No. 2 CA–CV
2010–0001, 2010 WL 4296642 (Ariz. App. Div. Oct. 28, 2010).
68 See Jennifer Nou, Note, Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integrity Through
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sought to clamp an iron cover of contractual legal prohibitions to bar
public investigation of anomalies and irregularities. Vendors have
routinely threatened lawsuits against election jurisdictions or county
governments for violation of alleged proprietary and contractual
rights when the election officials simply seek to ascertain the correct
vote tallies from ambiguous or questionable tabulation reports.69 The
vendors thus use the clauses to eliminate the risk that evidence will be
generated that can contradict the marketing assurances that the
systems function accurately in real elections. Such evidence would
potentially support claims of product defect or noncompliance with
governing legal standards for election accuracy.
Because no federal agency collects voting system “incidents” and
malfunction reports 70 and state governments generally do not assume

Procurement Contracts, 118 YALE L.J. 744, 781 (2009) (citing Diebold’s argument that its
software constituted a trade secret and could not be accessed by the board of elections); Joseph
Lorenzo Hall, Contractual Barriers to Transparency in Electronic Voting (2007),
http://static.usenix.org/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/hall/hall.pdf (explaining that voting system
contracts restrict analysis and contain confidentiality provisions).
69 The Diebold Corporation claimed that the Public Monitor’s review of the database to
ascertain corruption was prohibited by its contract with Cuyahoga County. But the Monitor
prevailed, as a duly appointed agent of the County. See COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC AUDIT OF THE
NOVEMBER 2006 GENERAL ELECTION 34–36, 66–67 (2007) (discussing the difficulties faced
with obtaining the necessary files). More recently, ES&S threatened to sue Venango County for
convening a forensic assessment of election anomalies. See Luther Weeks, Voting Machine
Investigation Leads to Serious Issues and Cover-Up, CTVOTERSCOUNT (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.ctvoterscount.org/painvestigation/ (explaining that ES&S is suing investigators);
Forensic Analysis Finds Venango County E–Voting System “Remotely Accessed” on “Multiple
Occasions” by Unknown Computer, THE VOTING NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://thevotingnews.com/blogs/forensic-analysis-finds-venango-county-pennsylvania-e-votingsystem-remotely-accessed-on-multiple-occasions-by-unknown-computer-the-brad-blog/
(discussing ES&S’s threats to sue).
70 The U.S. Election Assistance Commission has the jurisdiction, the power and arguably
the duty, to generate an “incident” inventory. See HAVA § 15322 (2006) (describing the duties
of the Election Assistance Commission). HAVA transferred the FEC informational
clearinghouse duties to the EAC, including the reports function regarding voting systems
performance. See id. (incorporating by reference the duties of HAVA §§ 15361–15387 (2006)).
Whether the EAC holds clearinghouse duties to gather and post information regarding the
performance of voting systems that lack EAC certification has been disputed. At a hearing on
Dec. 8, 2008, the EAC heard oral testimony and received written statements regarding its
clearinghouse powers and duty regarding these systems. See U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n,
Minutes
of
the
Public
Meeting
(2008),
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/transcript%20public%20meeting%20december%20
8%2020081.pdf (transcribing the testimony and statements regarding the EAC’s powers).
HAVA expressly confers EAC authority, and arguably a statutory duty, to provide voting
systems informational (clearinghouse) reporting on voting systems that pre–date the EAC’s
certification system. See HAVA § 15371 (2006) (providing the EAC with the authority to
certify and test voting systems). In § 15362(e), HAVA provides that the 2002 FEC standards
“shall be deemed to have been adopted by the Commission as of” the date HAVA is enacted. Id.
at § 15362(e). Hence, the FEC standards are now EAC standards, and the clearinghouse
reporting duties encompass pre–EAC and post–EAC voting systems.
But the EAC has taken the position that its Quality Monitoring Program will collect
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this task, media reports have become the major source of
documentation of flawed performance.
B. Field Experience of Problematic Voting Systems
Relatively unknown by the American voting public, a substantial
empirical record demonstrates that the TTBR and EVEREST reports
accurately predicted the inability of the voting systems to function
reliably in generating consistently accurate tallies. 71 Deployed voting
systems have produced negative numbers of votes cast,72 failed to
activate at the polls,73 and permitted the concealed mismatching of
candidates to bubbles or buttons,74 resulting in “flipping” votes
between candidates.75 Without provocation or human error the
systems have, for instance, counted some ballot batches or precincts
multiple times 76 or produced vote tallies reflecting 3–5 times more
ballots than participating voters. 77

incidents and indicators of anomalies and malfunctions only for voting systems that have been
tested in EAC-NIST certified labs and that have earned an EAC-certification for satisfying the
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). See Quality Monitoring Program, U.S.
ELECTION
ASSISTANCE
COMM’N,
http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/quality_monitoring_program.aspx (last visited
May 10, 2012) (explaining that the EAC issues advisories for anomalies with EAC-certified
systems). The EAC opines: “System Advisory Notices are an important part of the Quality
Monitoring Program. EAC issues advisories to inform jurisdictions and members of the public
of an existing anomaly or issue with an EAC-certified system.” Id.
The agency relented somewhat and permits State and local election officials to file voting
systems studies and reports which the EAC posts on its website. See Voting Systems Reports
Collection,
U.S.
ELECTION
ASSISTANCE
COMM’N,
http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/voting_system_reports.aspx (last visited May 10,
2012) (providing voting system reports and studies conducted by state and local governments).
The Brennan Center has offered an alternative “database inventor” approach in its recent report.
See LAWRENCE NORDEN, VOTING SYSTEM FAILURES: A DATABASE SOLUTION 27–32 (2010)
(proposing a publicly available, searchable centralized database).
71 A partial inventory of miscounts in real elections has been produced by Common Cause
& VotersUnite!. A Master List of 70+ Voting Machine Failures and Miscounts by State,
COMMON
CAUSE,
http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7Bfb3c17e2-cdd1-4df6-92bebd4429893665%7D/MASTERLISTOFMACHINEFAILURES.PDF (last visited May 10, 2012).
In 2009, VotersUnite! extended its study to errors committed attributable to ballot
scanning technology, to demonstrate that these devices are not panaceas but equally afflicted
with buggy software and security failings. Scanners do, however, offer one critical difference: a
voter-marked paper ballot that can be re-tabulated by hand or by a validated scanner. See ELLEN
THEISEN, BALLOT–SCANNER VOTING SYSTEM FAILURES IN THE NEWS—A PARTIAL LIST (2009)
(tracking malfunctions of ballot-scanner systems); NORDEN, supra note 70, at 46–96 (collecting
incidents of miscounts in Appendix B).
72 See NORDEN, supra note 70, at 14 (citing 16,000 negative votes being recorded in one
county).
73 See id. at 16 (explaining that hundreds of polling sites had to delay opening their doors).
74 Id. at 88–89, 94–95.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 21, 55, 87.
77 See THEISEN, supra note 71, at 4, 38 (noting discrepancies between the number of
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While optical scanners generate a voter-marked paper ballot, these
systems are not foolproof in part because they use the same flawed
central tabulating software as DREs. One nonprofit study reported in
2009:
Despite historical evidence of scanner miscounts, results
generated by ballot-scanner systems are rarely verified by a
hand count unless the results appear implausible. Virtually all
the miscounts described [in this report of over one hundred
events] were detected by hand counting ballots when
scanners produced implausible results. In some cases,
erroneous results were certified because they appeared
plausible and the error was discovered only after
certification. 78
With fewer than half the states conducting rigorous post-election
audits to ascertain election tally accuracy, and fiscal pressures not to
undertake “unessential” or new work, tabulation vote reports will
generally not be reassessed in the absence of blatant improbability.
C. Research Conclusions with Import for Voting Rights and Election
Law
Information systems are designed to fulfill particular hierarchies of
functions and attributes, and must trade-off some capacities to
achieve higher ranked objectives. Many operational contexts do not
share with public elections the same critical need for high assurance
of accuracy, security, and reliability. But Election Day and early
voting are highly circumscribed opportunities where the voting
equipment must be serviceable for the voters; it must function to
record and process votes accurately during the limited time any voter
is present or those votes may be lost and those voters disenfranchised.
TTBR and EVEREST produced three overall conclusions highly
germane to whether fundamental voting rights are achieved. First, the
operations of these voting systems are controlled by software so
significantly flawed that those who teach software design and coding
have pronounced it unfit for high confidence in its accuracy and
reliability. 79 Second, they conclude that the software—the controls

ballots cast and the number of votes counted).
78 Id. at 2.
79 As TTBR co-principal investigator Matt Bishop summarized, “The red teams
demonstrated that the security mechanisms provided for all systems analyzed were inadequate
to ensure accuracy and integrity of the election results and of the systems that provide those
results.” BISHOP, supra note 64, at 11; see also EVEREST EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 54, at
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over the entire election processes culminating in a cast votes report—
is unable to provide assured accountability for whether the product
has functioned normally—accurately—in election operations. 80
Thus, in 2007, an array of the most widely respected experts in
computer science and voting systems software informed us that the
equipment that determines whether fundamental rights to vote will be
fulfilled offers vast reasons not to trust the election outcomes this
equipment produces. Further, breaching the basic precepts of
information systems design where data accuracy and security are
crucial objectives, the equipment does not provide trustworthy
electronic self-reporting on core performance, including whether the
equipment has operated as intended in allocating votes to candidates
or counting ballots from all precincts. 81 Those with vast knowledge of
both the software industry’s engineering standards and the tools for
diagnosing anomalies have counseled the public and election officials
that without other corrections and quality assurance steps,82 these
machines are unfit for voting.
If engineering assessments of a commercial aircraft were equally
negative regarding the aviation software’s compliance with the
industry’s best practices for assuring human safety, the Federal
Aviation Administration has the power and the staff expertise to
declare it “not airworthy.” 83 Such aircraft must remain grounded until
14–72 (EVEREST private consultants concluding that all of the voting systems fell well below
reasonable engineering expectations, with Diebold/Premier & Hart scoring zero of twelve
possible points and ES&S scoring one point). See also supra text accompanying notes 57–65.
80 Private sector IT security firm MicroSolved “concluded that the voting machine
companies have failed to adopt, implement and follow industry standard best practices in the
development of the system.” EVEREST EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 54, at 15 (internal
quotation marks omitted). These conclusions may be analogized to expert civil engineers
reporting that a major transportation bridge was not engineered consistent with industry
standards, and is unfit for carrying traffic.
81 Rather stunningly, voting systems logging functions that monitor performance have not
been designed to be automatic and impervious to change. Unlike aircraft flight recorders and
financial institution accounting software, those who are “insiders” and considered to have a
conflict of interest are able to manually configure voting systems’ logs, the purpose of which are
to report on system and operator performance. See, e.g., UC SOURCE CODE REVIEW, supra note
35, at 36 (identifying “Issue 5.1.4: The audit log does not adequately detect malicious
tampering”); id. at 53 (noting “Issue 5.3.2: Anyone with access to the GEMS server’s local disk
can modify the GEMS database,” which includes the audit logs).
82 See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing how voting equipment that is
controlled by flawed software can still be used to achieve accurate election results).
83 “An airworthy aircraft is one that is fit to fly.” Airworthiness, SKYBRARY,
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Airworthiness (last updated Sept. 1, 2011).
Congress has not delegated a power equivalent to the FAA’s to ensure voting systems’
constitutional or statutory sufficiency. HAVA delegates to the U.S. Attorney General the power
to enforce HAVA’s minimum standards for voting equipment accuracy, auditability,
accessibility and other requirements. Other than enforcing alternative language and accessibility
requirements, the Department of Justice has basically ignored its HAVA enforcement duties
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modifications and further assessments declare it airworthy. In
contrast, although both voting and aviation require quality
engineering to achieve accuracy in operations, no federal agency is
empowered to issue analogous judgments and orders regarding the
engineering inadequacy of voting systems. Further, under the
regulatory rules governing flight performance data recorders in
commercial aircraft, by design and operation the data recorders are
protected from the aircraft carrier’s control, from the pilot’s influence,
and even from horrific crash disasters. 84 The information systems
industry has engineered data recording systems worthy of trust even
in extremely challenging physical conditions, such as those of
aviation disasters, and could do so for voting systems but the
qualified TTBR and EVEREST assessors reported that the voting
industry did not implement auditing designs that warrant trust in the
equipment’s output.
The third core conclusion the scientific studies reached is equally
critical for voting rights: all of the deployed e-voting systems have
incorporated multiple, easily utilized pathways for motivated insiders
to subvert elections without a trace.85 The EVEREST academic
researchers ultimate conclusion stressed: “All of the studied systems
possess critical security failures that render [them] . . . insufficient to
guarantee a trustworthy election.”86 Translated into traditional
considerations for election law, the deployed e-voting systems have
allowed numerous secret methods for dishonest or highly partisan
vendors, vendor personnel (including software programmers),
election office staff, poll workers or voters to engage in the electronic
equivalent of ballot box stuffing 87 and to erase any tracks back to

under Title III.
84 See
Flight
Data
Recorders
(FDR),
SKYBRARY,
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Flight_Data_Recorder_(FDR)#Principles_of_Operation
(last updated June 16, 2011) (“The recorder is installed in the most crash survivable part of the
aircraft, usually the tail section. The data collected in the FDR system can help investigators
determine whether an accident was caused by pilot error, by an external event (such as
windshear), or by an airplane system problem.”). Though election logging functions do not need
to withstand a crash from 50,000 feet, they should be engineered for realistic election
conditions; some minimum standards are specified in the federal Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines. See 1 UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, VOLUNTARY VOTING
SYSTEM GUIDELINES § 2.1.5.1 (2005) (listing minimum requirements that voting systems
should meet and stating that “[a]udit records shall be prepared for all phases of election
operations performed using devices controlled by the jurisdiction or its contractors”).
85 See EVEREST EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 54, at 15 (“[T]here was a lack of
integrity controls that have been applied to the voting systems . . . . [There are] vulnerabilities in
all three voting systems that could allow attackers to introduce an infection or malicious
programming (malware) into the voting system.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 Id. at 35.
87 In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963), the Court stressed that the right to vote
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themselves. Some vendors even included design elements that
practically invite tampering, such as including a “clear” button for
erasing audit logging of operator actions inside the tabulation
database. 88 This option permits someone to modify vote totals for a
race, such as by flipping the results between candidates, and then
erasing the automatic record that would have recorded the data
modification. 89 The bottom line security point: use of all-electronic
voting equipment without quality assurance techniques that rely on a
tangible record of the voter’s choices independent of the electronic
equipment permits nefarious conduct to convert voting rights into an
illusion. 90
In legal challenges to all-electronic voting systems, the judiciary
has thus far failed to address the TTBR and EVEREST conclusions
that the scientific community considers to be definitive studies.
Recent judicial rulings continue to rely on precedent that preceded the
TTBR and EVEREST reports. 91

encompasses the right to have the vote correctly counted as cast:
Every voter's vote is entitled to be counted once. It must be correctly counted and
reported. As stated in United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 [(1915)], “the right
to have one's vote counted” has the same dignity as “the right to put a ballot in a
box.” It can be protected from the diluting effect of illegal ballots. Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 [(1879)]; United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 [(1944)].
see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964) (“Undeniably the Constitution of
the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote . . . . The right to vote can
neither be denied outright, nor destroyed by alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot-box
stuffing.”) (citations omitted); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a
vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right
secured by the Constitution, when such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally, or by
a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts, or by a stuffing of the ballot box.”)
(internal citations omitted); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941) (“Obviously
included within the right to choose, secured by the Constitution, is the right of qualified voters
within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congressional elections.”).
88 See DEBRA BOWEN, CALIFORNIA SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT TO THE ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION CONCERNING ERRORS AND DEFICIENCIES IN DIEBOLD/PREMIER
GEMS VERSION 1.18.19, 7 (2009) (“GEMS version 1.18.19 is designed to permit the operator to
delete the audit trail records in two important audit logs, intentionally or inadvertently. The
records can be deleted by selecting ‘Clear’ buttons that appear on the audit log screens between
the ‘Save As…’ and ‘Close’ buttons.”).
89 Id.
90 In other words, the conclusion that the software is seriously flawed and should not be
trusted does not necessarily require that the voting systems be discarded. Certain procedural
steps permit the identification and correction of errors. See P.B. Stark & D.A. Wagner, supra
note 63 (arguing “that there should be more focus on regulating procedures, especially the
curation of the audit trail, and less focus on certifying tabulation equipment, in part because
certification can never guarantee that votes are tabulated accurately in practice”) (emphasis
added).
91 See, e.g., Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2011) (ruling that the
Texas Secretary of State had the power to balance relative assets and deficiencies of the
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D. Emerging Threats
The need for judicial attention to the problems of e-voting is
becoming more pronounced, as vendors are now aggressively
marketing voting systems to state and local governments with even
more security holes than the currently deployed precinct-based voting
systems. Vendors are currently pressing state governments to permit
Internet transmission of voted ballots on their proprietary software. 92
Over half the states have now approved Internet voting for military
and overseas civilian voters 93 despite the computer security
community’s virtual unanimity regarding the grave dangers this poses
to individual ballots and systemic integrity. The scientists have
underscored that Internet-transmitted ballots will eliminate the
capacity to assure that the ballots of only authorized voters will be
counted, and that ballots will arrive with the same vote choices the
voter originally marked. 94 Additionally, such all-electronic Internet
systems provide no external audit capacity, 95 so whatever totals the
election officials announce cannot be recounted or otherwise checked;
the results could be completely falsified by foreign adversaries or be a
product of software bugs yet would provide no extrinsic evidence as a

challenged all-electronic DRE voting systems, and that under a rational basis review, the court
lacked the power to displace that judgment).
92 For instance, the state legislatures in Connecticut, Colorado and Oregon have
considered bills that would authorize Internet voting for domestic voters and not simply military
and overseas civilian voters.
93 Verified Voting’s informational webpage identifies thirty–three States that authorize
electronic voting ballots to be returned via an Internet–based (web portal, e–mail, or fax)
method for military personnel and citizens overseas. Internet Voting Information: Military and
Overseas
Voting
2012,
VERIFIED
VOTING
FOUNDATION,
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?list=type&type=27 (last visited May 10, ,
2012). An obscure Federal agency within the personnel division of the Department of Defense
has lobbied state governments to adopt Internet voting for military and overseas civilian voters.
See generally Candice Hoke & Matt Bishop, Essential Research Needed to Support UOCAVAMOVE Act Implementation at the State and Local Levels (Oct. 25, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1697848.
94 For example, MIT computer scientist and cryptography expert Professor Ron Rivest
opposes Internet voting because we do not yet have the necessary technology to implement
secure online voting systems. See Alex Altman, Will Online Voting Turn Into an Election Day
Debacle?, TIME, Oct. 15, 2010 http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2025696,00.html
(“‘We don’t have the technology yet to do this in a secure way, and we may not for a decade or
more,’ says Ron Rivest, a computer scientist and cryptography expert at MIT. The worst-case
scenario? ‘You may find elections that end up with a totally unclear result,’ Rivest says. ‘You
may find the entire system taken over and trashed.’”).
95 See, e.g., David Jefferson, If I Can Shop and Bank Online, Why Can’t I Vote Online? 3
(2011), http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/jefferson-onlinevoting.pdf (“[I]n the
online election world there are no receipts, no double entry bookkeeping, and no meaningful
audit trail information.”).
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check. 96 Information security experts emphasize that the Internet was
not engineered for secure data transmissions, 97 and, without that
security, voted ballots cannot be trusted to arrive in the same version
as the remote absentee voter intended.98
Given that U.S. elections are considered high value, easy targets
for cyber attack, 99 and that virtually every major U.S. government and
private sector defense industry network has been breached with a
sophisticated cyber attack despite their defensive apparatus,100 the
cyber security experts conclude that no reasonable basis exists for
trusting that an Internet-based election will not be falsified in some
manner. 101 They caution that even if ballots are encrypted, hundreds
of vectors remain available for impacting the integrity of an Internet
96 See generally P.B. Stark & D.A. Wagner, supra note 63 (explaining the tools that can
produce evidence of accuracy and inaccuracy in election tallies, and obviate the mystifying
“black box” of e-voting).
97 See generally MATT BISHOP, COMPUTER SECURITY: ART & SCIENCE (2002) (clarifying
that public networks are pervaded with dangerous threats that include such malware as viruses,
worms, botnets; complete defenses remain unavailable); Jonathan Zittrain, Without a Net: The
Internet Is Vulnerable to Viruses so Lethal That They Could Gravely Damage the Online
World–Unless We Upgrade Law and Technology Now, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan.–Feb. 2006),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/feature_zittrain_janfeb06.msp
(“[A]lthough hundreds of millions of personal computers are now connected to the Internet and
ostensibly protected by firewalls and antivirus software, our technological infrastructure is in
fact less secure than it was in 1988.”).
98 See In Theory And Practice, Why Internet–Based Voting Is a Bad Idea, SLASHDOT
(Mar. 2, 2012, 4:47 PM), http://politics.slashdot.org/story/12/03/02/1940236/in-theory-andpractice-why-Internet-based-voting-is-a-bad-idea [hereinafter Bad Idea] (arguing that Internet
voting systems can be easily manipulated “because the structure of an electronic voting system
is inherently complex . . . it's difficult if not impossible to roll back results if a compromise is
suspected[,] . . . [and,] [u]nlike paper ballots[,] . . . online vote gathering offers no good way to
re-count”).
99 See, e.g., Professor Ronald Rivest, Power Point Presentation: Thoughts on UOCAVA
Voting
(Aug.
6,
2010),
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/UOCAVA/2010/Presentations/RIVEST_2010-08-05-uocava.pdf
(concluding that the likelihood of a successful attack on a U.S. Internet-conducted election is
100 percent); David Jefferson, Power Point Presentation: Internet Voting for UOCAVA Voters
(Aug.
6,
2010),
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/UOCAVA/2010/Presentations/JEFFERSON_UOCAVA_Worksh
op_Panel.pdf (emphasizing that election integrity is a national security matter).
100 Formerly Director of National Intelligence and now a private security consultant, Mike
McConnell commented, “In looking at computer systems of consequence—in government,
Congress, at the Department of Defense, aerospace, companies with valuable trade secrets—
we’ve not examined one yet that has not been infected by an advanced persistent threat.” Nicole
Perlroth, Traveling Light in a Time of Digital Thievery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A1
(emphasis added). An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is considered the most serious and
persistent type of cyber-attack, designed by “a sophisticated and organized” attacker to “access
and steal information from compromised computers . . . intruders responsible for the APT
attacks target the defense industrial base (DIB) [and the financial, manufacturing, and research
industries]. The attacks used by the APT intruders are not very different from any other intruder.
The main differentiator is the APT intruder’s perseverance and resources.” Advanced Persistent
Threat, MANDIANT, www.mandiant.com/services/advanced_persistent_threat (last visited May
10, 2012).
101 See David Jefferson, The Dangers of Email Voting, (2011) (draft on file with author).
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election. 102 Though online ballot marking systems and complete
Internet voting that transmit blank and marked ballots through the
Internet unquestionably cannot offer confidence that they will be
received without en route falsification thus to be counted as cast, 103
states are adopting these systems. Unfortunately, thus far no state or
local official or their vendors are disclosing these vulnerabilities to
voters. 104 Nor do legislators and election officials generally
comprehend the national security aspects of elections vulnerable to
covert cyber attacks from abroad. 105 Apparently election officers and
102 See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 95, at 2–3 (“We have to recognize that the cost to the
attacker of conducting a remote online attack has declined drastically over the last few
years . . . . [I]t [is] possible to duplicate even very sophisticated attack vectors like Stuxnet, the
malware that did great damage to Iranian nuclear facilities, in about two months time for under
$20,000. We are now in a very different threat environment than we were even a few years
ago.”) (citation omitted); Jaikumar Vijayan, Internet Voting Systems Too Insecure, Researcher
Warns,
COMPUTERWORLD
(Mar.
1,
2012,
12:13
PM)
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9224799/Internet_voting_systems_too_insecure_resea
rcher_warns?taxonomyId=17&pageNumber=2 (“[A] team of researchers [was able to] easily
[break] into [Washington state’s electronic voting] system, and show[] how they could modify
and replace marked ballots in the system. The researchers even tweaked the system so that
voters would be greeted with the University of Michigan fight song when they landed on the
vote confirmation page.”); see also Jeremy Epstein, Internet Voting, Security, and Privacy, 19
WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 885 (2011) (explaining the technical problems of Internet voting
systems and their dangerous impact for voting rights and election integrity); Barbara Simons &
Doug W. Jones, Internet Voting in the U.S., ACM Library (2011) (same). But see MICHAEL
ALVAREZ & THAD HALL, POINT, CLICK AND VOTE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNET VOTING 4–11
(2004) (perceiving great promise and manageable security threats in Internet voting and
contending that “a strong argument can be made for pilot testing Internet voting systems in real
elections”).
103 During the public test of the District of Columbia’s Internet voting system, Professor
Halderman was able to attack the system and “replace all of the encrypted ballot files on the
server . . . with a forged ballot of [his] choosing.” Scott Wolchok et al., Attacking the
Washington,
D.C.
Internet
Voting
System
7
(2012),
http://fc12.ifca.ai/preproceedings/paper_79.pdf.; see also David Jefferson & Candice Hoke, The Dangers of OnScreen and Online Electronic Ballot Marking (2012) (draft on file with author).
104 States adopting these online ballot marking systems include Colorado, see Electronic
Voting
Systems
Fact
Sheet,
FEDERAL
VOTING
ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM,
http://www.fvap.gov/resources/media/evswfactsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 15. 2012) (“[Six]
Colorado counties (El Paso, Gilpen, Morgan, Park, Weld, and Yuma Counties) offer a state
system which allows voters to mark the ballot online.”), and Maryland, see S. 1078, 2012 Gen.
Assemb. 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (“The State Board of Elections (SBE) must provide an optional
online ballot marking tool . . . .”). But see Letter from Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec. of State, to all
County
Clerks/Registrars
of
Voters
(Nov.
8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ccrov/pdf/2011/november/11111lf.pdf (“[Voting systems with]
an option to mark votes on the ballot using the voter's computer . . . [are] not permitted for use
in California under state law.”).
105 See Jefferson, supra note 95, at 1, 3 (“[C]omputer and network security experts are
virtually unanimous in pointing out that online voting is an exceedingly dangerous threat to the
integrity of U.S. elections. There is no way to guarantee that the security, privacy, and
transparency requirements for elections can all be met with any practical technology in the
foreseeable future. . . . Election security is . . . a matter of national security . . . .”); Bad Idea,
supra note 98 (“The risk of hacked elections isn’t just the possibility of political rivals trying to
out-do each other[.] . . . [U]ltimately, vulnerable election systems compromise national security
and ballot secrecy.”).
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their lawyers have yet to translate the TTBR and EVEREST
conclusions concerning these all-electronic voting systems into the
concepts and categories relevant to election law, such as unlawful
“vote dilution” 106 or failures to produce provably accurate elections.
II. “LENSES” AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Professor Richard Hasen has identified constitutional law and
political science as the progenitors of election law in light of these
fields’ profuse scholarship on voting rights, campaign finance, and
redistricting. 107 In order for scientific facts about currently deployed
voting systems to guide voting technology policy and adjudication, 108
perhaps the time has come for election law scholars to enlarge the
recognized “parents” of election law. Given the centrality of voting
technology adequacy to realizing the fullness of voting rights and
popular sovereignty, it appears overdue for election law to embrace
the computer science and information security fields 109 as a co-equal
nurturing “parent”—or at least as a valued aunt or uncle—of election
law.
Political science categories and research methodologies have
supplied crucial information and valuable heuristics relevant to the
legal sufficiency of certain types of voting technologies. For instance,
by questioning “residual vote rates” 110 researchers were able to study
the relationship between lost votes and voting technologies, and to
establish that voters of racial and ethnic minority groups generally
106 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1665 (2001) (arguing that vote dilution claims relate to aggregative rights of groups
which cannot be adjudicated within the conventional individual rights framework).
107 See Richard L. Hasen, Election Law at Puberty: Optimism and Words of Caution, 32
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1095, 1095 (1999) (naming constitutional law and political science as the
“parents” of election law).
108 My objective accords with Heather Gerken’s as she calls for “hard data and rigorous
analysis” to drive election policy. Some of the hard data and analytic frameworks missing thus
far must be found in information security rather than political science. See HEATHER GERKEN,
THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 5859
(2009) (drawing on Dan Tokaji’s “moneyball” approach).
109 Federal policymakers have recently decided that they would like to combine the
different terms for information system security into one term, cybersecurity, which embraces the
entire field from individual computing devices to networks as large as the Internet. “Shaping the
Future of Cybersecurity Education” Workshop, NIST (Sept. 20–22, 2011),
http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/Sept2011-workshop/.
110 Political scientists crafted the term and its empirical assessments in part to determine
whether racial and ethnic minorities voting power had been diminished disproportionately
because of voting technology. See, e.g., The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Residual
Votes Attributable to Technology: An Assessment of the Reliability of Existing Voting
Equipment
1–2
(Mar.
30,
2001),
http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/residual_votes_attributable_to_tech.pdf
(examining
incidence of spoiled and unmarked ballots, termed the residual vote rate, associated with each
type of voting equipment).

2012]

JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

1023

were allocated equipment that permitted substantially higher error
rates. 111 Litigation could then successfully challenge particular voting
technologies as legally insufficient for underserved minorities’ full
voting participation. 112
Political science, however, has not supplied sufficient analytic
frameworks and methodologies by which other legally relevant
deficiencies in voting technology can be identified. As demonstrated
above, 113 the computer or information security subfield of computer
science supplies powerful tools—better lenses as it were—for
perceiving and understanding serious technological flaws that relate
to voting rights; these flaws remain largely invisible if using only
political science methods or “lenses.”
It may be that information system and security concerns have
fallen prey to the supposed dichotomy and debate in election law
between assuring voter “access” or ensuring the “integrity” of the
vote count.114 Since one’s position on the access/integrity divide has
often been viewed as code for political party commitment, and the
“integrity” side has accumulated a multi-year sordid record for
attempted voter suppression on the basis of spurious claims of voter
fraud, 115 the wrongful classification of computer security points as
111 Id.
112 Litigation where structural challenges to voting technology were predicated on the
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act include
Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot 473 F.3d 692 (2007), and
Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill 2002).
113 See supra Part I.
114 The conception persists that access and integrity are opposed values that also function
as thin shields for partisan opportunism. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of
Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 937, 983–85 (2005) (advocating a model of nonpartisan election administration
with an allegiance to the “integrity of the process itself,” rather than “to any particular electoral
outcome”); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,
Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1233 (2005)
(describing “HAVA's access/integrity compromise”); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Refining The Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1051, 1058 (2010) (responding to Rick
Hasen’s conception of the Canon as detailed in Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62
STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009)). As these scholars have clarified, “access” constellations of issues
have been conceptualized as concerned with expanding voter participation and removing
barriers to voting. Id. at 1051. As such, some consider these core Democratic Party concerns,
and further view a genuine commitment to voter access and broad civic participation to justify
“convenience . . . voting.” Daniel P. Tokaji & Ruth Coker, Absentee Voting by People with
Disabilities: Promoting Access and Integrity, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1015, 1027 (2007). At the
other supposed pole, “integrity” values have sometimes been used to justify tremendous burdens
on voter participation, such as by arduous voter identification requirements, as have thus been
viewed Republican Party’s domain. Id. at 1043. This author joins others who view the
access/integrity split as a false dichotomy. Id.
115 See RICHARD HASEN, THE VOTING WARS (forthcoming 2012) (detailing thinly veiled
voter suppression efforts conducted under the flag of achieving integrity”); WENDY R. WEISER
AND LAWRENCE NORDEN, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN 2012 33 (2011) (discussing Ohio votersuppression legislation).
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exclusively “integrity” concerns may have led to their receiving little
traction among election law scholars. 116
By shifting to a different field of expertise, though, the change in
central concerns and methodologies can in turn bring forward
powerful new perceptions. Using computer or information security
“lenses,” the central triadic planes for analysis become system
“availability” for use as intended,117 confidentiality, and data
“integrity”—the last of which captures “both the correctness and the
trustworthiness of the data.” 118 Computer security is therefore deeply
concerned with the voting equipment’s availability and reliability for
casting ballots, and hence to traditional “access” concerns.
Classifying the voting system computer security assessments as
relating only to “integrity” is thus wrong in two ways. It excludes the
field’s core concerns for achieving effective use of the technical
equipment, embracing reliability and voter access. Additionally, when
a claim is made that the security studies only relate to “integrity,”
grave miscommunication occurs because the field’s conception of
“integrity” differs in depth and centrality that neither election law nor
political science has yet grasped.
Properly characterized in terms that the Fourteenth Amendment
comprehends, for instance by using voting participation or access
rights, vote dilution, and ballot box stuffing, the particular threats
presented by all-electronic, unverifiable voting systems can be
effectively redressed by the judiciary. The initial challenges have
focused on all-electronic DRE systems, but all e-voting systems are
capable of flawed tabulations; fortunately, however, these errors
normally can be caught and corrected by use of robust post-election
auditing techniques. 119
A. Litigation Challenging DREs
Three federal circuits 120 and state courts in Arizona, 121 Texas, 122
Pennsylvania,123 Maryland, 124 Georgia, 125 and New Jersey 126 have
116 Additionally, because the debate has also been framed as a set of ineluctable tradeoffs
between civil rights objectives and their political opponents, the information security experts’
concerns may have been tacitly rejected under the assumption that accessibility or voter
convenience would inevitably be diminished taking into account information security concerns.
117 See MATT B ISHOP, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SECURITY 1, 4 (2003) (“Computer
security rests on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.”).
118 Id. at 3.
119 See infra text accompanying note 157.
120 Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that all-electronic
DREs lacking a voter-verified paper record do not deprive voters of legal rights); Wexler v.
Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Tex. Democratic Party v. Williams,
285 F. App’x. 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 912 (2009)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of Secretary of State on claims that DRE deprived voters

2012]

JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

1025

ruled on claims that electronic DRE-touchscreen voting devices are
constitutionally invalid if they lack a voter-verified contemporaneous
paper record of the vote selections. Thus far, the courts have not been
particularly receptive to these claims, whether predicated on the
Fourteenth Amendment 127 or the state constitutions.
Irrespective of how the claims were legally grounded, the courts
that ruled against the plaintiffs chose a deferential standard of review
that largely insulated the pre-existing policy decision. Schade v.
Maryland, for instance, 128 is somewhat of an exemplar. There the
court applied an extremely deferential “arbitrary and capricious”
standard of review that the State Board of Elections urged, resulting
in no relief for the plaintiffs. Although the state legislature had
retained a highly experienced cyber security expert to conduct a
security analysis of the proposed DRE system, 129 the Maryland courts
did not accord his team’s assessment and recommendations with
authoritative weight. Instead, the court found the Board’s computer
science expert—who also was an attorney—a more credible expert,
perhaps because he knew how to translate between the two fields.
Although this expert lacked professional credentials as a computer
security expert, the trial court qualified him as such nonetheless and
permitted him unlimited expert scope. He then testified to the
“reasonableness” of the Board’s choice of paperless DREs that lacked
any record independent of the problematic software. He also testified

of equal protection and due process and violated the Election Code).
121 Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 408–09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (ruling that plaintiffs’
claims survived a motion to dismiss, specifically that voting machines violated the Arizona
Constitution’s “free and equal election” clause and the “privileges and immunities” clauses).
122 Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. 2011) (ruling that the Texas
Secretary of State had the power to balance relative assets and deficiencies of the challenged allelectronic DRE voting systems, and that under a rational basis review, the court lacked the
power to displace that judgment).
123 Banfield v. Cortes, 922 A.2d 36, 42 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (refusing to dismiss
electors’ claims that secretary of state had illegally certified DREs).
124 Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 930 A.2d 304, 328 (Md. 2007) (deferring to the
state board of elections’s judgment in certifying DREs that lacked a voter verified paper audit
trail).
125 Favorito v. Handel, 684 S.E.2d 257, 261–62 (Ga. 2009) (deferring to a political
branch).
126 Gusciora v. Corzine, No. MER–L–2691–04, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2319, 2332–33
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2010) (holding that State’s certification of DREs did not violate
voters’ equal protection or due process rights but mandating mitigations that the plaintiffs’
premier security experts had demonstrated to be ineffectual).
127 The federal constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment have been
predicated on the Equal Protection Clause or substantive or procedural due process. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
128 930 A.2d at 326.
129 RABA study, supra note 26.
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to the historic security issues with paper ballots, explicitly opining
that the introduction of an auditable permanent record of the voter’s
choices extrinsic to the voting machine would increase the security
problems rather than cure them. 130 Yet this expert had testified to the
Texas legislature with quite different concerns and conclusions,
completely in line with those of the TTBR and EVEREST scientists
largely contradicting his Maryland testimony. 131
The most recent DRE decision, from the Texas Supreme Court in
2011, was predicated on state statutory and constitutional law. The
NAACP of Austin and individual plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary
of State’s “failure to require a contemporaneous paper record of an
electronic vote violates their statutory right to a recount and an audit,
as well as Texas constitutional guarantees of equal protection, the
purity of the ballot box, and the right of suffrage.” 132 While the Court
granted plaintiffs standing on their equal protection claims, it chose a
deferential “sliding scale” standard of review drawn from other
election administrative cases. After quickly reviewing the line of prior
130 Additionally, the court credited the National Federal for the Blind’s arguments that a
paper ballot would destroy their members’ opportunities to vote “privately” and
“independently.” Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 930 A.2d 304, 312 (Md. 2007).
131 See Roy G. Saltman, U.S. Dep't. Of Commerce, NBS Special Publication 500–158,
Accuracy, Integrity, And Security In Computerized Vote–Tallying 1, 18–20 (1988),
http://www.itl.nist.gov/lab/specpubs/500-158.htm:

[T]he computer hardware and software used to tabulate the ballots is subject to
tampering. Furthermore, such tampering is relatively easy and invisible.... Computers
can be manipulated remotely, by wire or radio, or by direct physical input. The
memories on which these computers operate can easily fit into a shirt pocket and can
be substituted in seconds. The software can be set to await the receipt of a special
card, whose presence will cause all the election counters to be altered. This card
could be dropped into the ballot box by any confederate. The possibilities for this
type of tampering are endless, and virtually no detection is possible once tabulation
has been completed . . . .
Even if the software is not altered, there is no reason to believe that it is correct.
Many tests performed on such programs have revealed faulty logic and wildly
incorrect results . . . . Many jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, have complex rules
for counting such situations as cross-filed candidates in vote-for-many offices and it
is stretching to believe that an election system vendor would be aware of all such
combinations of conditions to have produced perfect software. It is axiomatic in the
computer industry that all large computer programs contain errors, and the more
extensive the software the more errors it contains....
When one company or a conglomerate of companies supply unauditable software
from a central distribution point, or participate directly in ballot setup procedures,
there exists the possibility of large-scale tampering with elections. An errant
programmer or tainted executive could influence or determine the outcome of a
majority of election precincts in the country . . . .
(quoting Dr. Michael I. Shamos’s testimony before the Texas legislature) (emphasis
added).
132 Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2011).
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DRE decisions, the Texas court followed the same analytic approach
that was first used in Weber v. Shelley, 133 a case decided in 2003 that
preceded all of the scientific assessments of voting systems. As in
Weber, the Texas court viewed DREs to offer some significant
advantages for certain classes of voters though also presenting some
drawbacks. 134
The court followed Professor Dan Tokaji’s approach of perceiving
the interest of all voters in an undiluted ballot to be of mere
hypothetical concern, whereas the supposed DRE accessibility
features for physically disabled voters were concrete improvements
for underserved populations. To the degree these two sets of concerns
were perceived to be in tension, 135 Tokaji and the Texas court
considered the accommodation objective of superior importance.136
Using highly deferential legal scrutiny, the court concluded that it
must defer the choice of voting technologies to the regulatory
decisions of the Texas Secretary of State.
The court’s perception of opposed objectives that justifies
deference rested on a superficial understanding of computer security
and misconceived the court’s role in achieving accessibility. The
133 347

F.3d 1101, 1106–07.
are not perfect. No voting system is. We cannot say that DREs impose severe
restrictions on voters, particularly in light of the significant benefits such machines offer.”
Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 14. The major difference between Andrade and the earlier decisions
lies in the Texas court’s reliance on Daniel Tokaji’s elaboration of four “equality norms” in
federal voting rights law. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and
Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1741 (2005). He draws the four norms from
anti-discrimination law, particularly the Voting Rights Act and Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, to yield racial equality, disability access, multi-language access, and inter–
jurisdictional equality. Id. at 1741–54. By contrast, Heather Gerken recognizes that the right to
be free from vote dilution, to have one’s ballot counted as cast and reflected in the tally, has not
been limited to classic antidiscrimination contexts. See Gerken, supra note 106 (stressing
freedom from vote dilution is an essential part of the structural, “aggregative” concept of voting
rights, which are held co-equally by all voters).
135 See Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at n. 22 quoting one commentator who suggests that
requiring contemporaneous paper records of DRE votes is problematic:
134 “DREs

First, it relies on the false assumption that paper-based systems are inherently more
accurate and reliable than paperless ones. Second, it disregards both long and recent
experience demonstrating the vulnerability of paper-based systems to fraud and
error. Third, it fails to comprehend the practical problems in actually implementing a
system that is capable of printing out a contemporaneous paper record, yet preserves
voter privacy and election security.
(quoting Tokaji, supra note 134, at 1780–81); see also id. at 1736 (noting that “many
election officials and some civil rights advocates have opposed a contemporaneous paper record
requirement, arguing that it is unnecessary, burdensome, and likely to discourage adoption of
accessible voting technology”).
136 Id. at 1795. Arguably, this approach reflects misunderstandings of the relation of
computer security design and robust coding function in the overall fulfillment of the right to
vote on computer-based equipment.
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court, moreover, lacked an understanding of how computer security
functions in the overall fulfillment of voter access and the right to
vote on computer-based equipment. The computer security field is
partly predicated on the insight that the electronic equipment’s
performance—its very availability and capacity to function for the
target audience, whether accessible voting systems or any others—is
substantially dependent upon the constellation of attributes that the
computer science field sums as its “security.” Thus, security is not at
war with accessibility but, joined by usability, provides the very
foundation on which accessibility features rest. A grossly insecure
system, be it paperless DREs or any other, is likely to be an accessible
voting device in theory only. 137 Field testing and security attributes
matter to whether accessible voting equipment requirements have
been achieved for real voters.
In contrast, rulings from the Sixth Circuit arguably present a more
defensible decisional framework. While the Sixth Circuit has not
ruled on a case seeking to invalidate DREs, it has issued opinions in a
triad of cases presenting equal protection and substantive due process
challenges to Ohio’s voting technology choices,138 its overall election
administrative system, 139 and, most recently, one county’s application
of rules governing the invalidation of provisional ballots. 140 Each
opinion displays a keen understanding of the federal judiciary’s
crucial role in ensuring that state political actors do not structure
election operations in ways that arguably result in systematic vote
dilution or debasement.
Unlike the courts that deferred to state political actors to determine
preferred voting technologies, 141 the Sixth Circuit recognizes that a
deferential standard of review cannot provide meaningful judicial
protection from election rules governing whether a voted ballot will
be counted or whether prohibited vote dilution has occurred.142 The
Stewart court’s analysis of cases from Yick Wo to Bush results in
distinguishing Burdick-type issues from claims that particular voters

137 Downtime or “unavailability” rates of DREs appear nontrivial given some incident
reports. See supra notes 70–71.
138 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 473 F.3d 692
(2007).
139 League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008).
140 Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011).
141 See, e.g., supra note 62, which relied on the Burdick precedential line directing rational
relation review; see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (further
complicating the standard of review questions); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992)
(adjudicating constitutionality of state law omission of a voter option to cast votes for write–in
candidates).
142 Stewart, 444 F.3d. at 856.
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were denied an equal chance to have their vote counted.143 Where
election rules or ballot counting practices operated at a structural level
to threaten the right to an equal voice through the ballot, the Court
subjected the challenged practice to strict scrutiny rather than to mere
rational relation review. 144
The Sixth Circuit’s argument that the Supreme Court’s precedents
specify this exacting standard of review is made somewhat more
difficult because the Supreme Court has often failed to explicitly
specify the standard of review when analyzing an election practice
under the equal protection clause.145 A less careful court might
mistake any unnamed analytic method as less than strict scrutiny. But
perhaps the best argument for strict scrutiny of structural challenges
to a voting technology’s constitutional sufficiency can be derived
from following the Court’s principle of according differential judicial
scrutiny to an equal protection claim depending on a threatened
right’s importance within the constitutional hierarchy. 146
The Court has consistently placed the right of suffrage at the
highest pinnacle of constitutional rights. In Yick Wo, the Court
characterized the right to vote as a “fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights.” 147 Almost a century later, courts
observed, “No right is more precious than the right of suffrage. It
involves ‘matters close to the core of our constitutional system.’” 148
The Court has also stressed, “No right is more precious in a free
143 Burdick is often described as prescribing the standard of review for adjudicating
election administrative questions under the equal protection clause. Space constraints prevent
depth exploration of Burdick’s import for the range of possible voting technology issues
potentially presented in litigation; these questions must await later work, Other scholars have
addressed Burdick and standards of review for election administration more generally. See, e.g.,
Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925 (2007); Edward B. Foley,
The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 350 (2007); but see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to
Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125 (2009); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Equal
Chance to Have One’s Vote Count, L. & PHIL., 121, 121 (2002).
144 The Court explicitly applied strict scrutiny in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336–43
(1972) (invalidating Tennessee’s residence requirement for voter eligibility), but arguably the
ballot box-stuffing cases as well. See cases cited supra note 87.
145 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating poll tax); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1962) (invalidating
statewide primary election method because it impermissibly accorded votes differential weight
depending on demographic features of the voter’s location). The Court explicitly applied strict
scrutiny in Dunn v. Blumstein,405 U.S. 330, 336–43 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee’s residence
requirement for voter eligibility).
146 As Rick Hasen remarks, this is “hornbook law.” Rick Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the
Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.REV. 377, 389 (2002).
147 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 139 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting and concurring) (observing that the right to vote “a civil
right of the highest order”).
148 United States v. Olinger, 759 F.2d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965)).
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country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make
the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” 149
Given the relative importance of voting rights and the requirement
that votes not be diluted or debased, those courts ruling on the legal
sufficiency of the DREs must apply strict scrutiny. 150
B. Scholarly Work Needed
Similarly, given the ample scientific and empirical live-election
performance evidence that demonstrates system software can cause
vote data to change in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner, and that
appropriate steps have not been taken to reduce these risks to voting
rights, a substantive due process claim should be available.151 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed that a complaint of errors in DRE vote
recording stated a violation of the Due Process Clause if sufficiently
unfair as to deny or severely burden Ohioans’ fundamental right to
vote. 152 It ruled: “[i]f the election process itself reaches the point of
patent and fundamental unfairness, a violation of the due process
clause may be indicated . . . . Such a situation must go well beyond
the ordinary dispute over the counting and marking of ballots.” 153 The
district court additionally held that the defendant State officers “may
be answerable for constitutional violations where state employees
have not been trained adequately and that lack of training has caused
constitutional wrongs,” or if they acted with “deliberate indifference
and/or willful blindness.” 154
While these judicial approaches are well designed for protecting
the right to vote and popular sovereignty from serious structural
dangers posed by misunderstood information technologies, they
warrant close evaluation by election law scholars who are considering
the concrete systemic threats posed by electronic voting systems. This
technological context holds significant but thus far widely
unrecognized threats to our system of popular sovereignty.
Adjudication under the same standards as whether votes for write-in
candidates must be counted, or even whether third parties have ballot
access rights to be listed on the ballot, do not compare. One might
contend the structural threats the currently deployed e-voting
149 Wesberry

v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
Hasen, supra note 114, at 951.
151 League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008).
152 Id. at 478.
153 Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930)).
154 League of Women Voters, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
150 See
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technologies pose to the American electoral system’s legitimacy are
far greater than any of the prior administrative issues that have been
litigated. 155
To the degree that fiscal concerns are sub silentio affecting judicial
choice of the standard of review, the judiciary as well as other public
officials might be pleased to learn that alternatives to junking the
existing machines are available that can solve many of the most
egregious issues. The computer security experts with preeminent
qualifications in the field have concluded that the best approach is to
not trust the software to be correct or to produce correct tallies. 156
155 Scholars who have addressed the individual vs. structural rights paradigms in voting
law include: Vikram D. Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50
STAN. L. REV. 915, 923 (1998) (considering Fifteenth Amendment rights and arguing for a
“constitutional model” of voting and other political rights that recognizes both individual and
group rights); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663 (2001); Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 109 (1994) (identifying inadequacy of existing voting rights jurisprudence for handling
claims involving racial groups); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an
American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 84 (arguing voting rights law must
reconceptualize “voting-rights remedies to accommodate the claims for representation made by
ethnic and racial groups”); see also Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1204–08 (1996) (observing that voting rights law differs from
other equal protection contexts as law voters are treated as members of group).
156 See, e.g., P.B. Stark & D.A. Wagner, supra note 63 discussing the requirements of a
software-independent system:

A voting system is strongly software-independent, if an undetected error or change to
its software cannot produce an undetectable change in the outcome, and we can find
the correct outcome without re-running the election. Strong software-independence
does not mean the voting system has no software; rather, it means that even if its
software has a flaw that causes it to give the wrong outcome, the overall system still
produces “breadcrumbs” (an audit trail) from which we can find the true outcome,
despite any flaw in the software. Systems that produce voter-verifiable paper records
(VVPRs) [for instance, voter marked paper ballots] as an audit trail are strongly
software-independent, provided the integrity of that audit trail is maintained, because
the audit trail can be used to determine the true outcome.
Both authors hail from the University of California, Berkeley. Professor David Wagner
served as one of the two TTBR leaders and also as the team leader of the Diebold source code
team; he also serves on the NIST-EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee working
to develop voting systems standards. Professor Philip Stark, a professor of statistics, served on
the post–election audit blue-ribbon panel convened as an ally to the TTBR. Its report,
EVALUATION
OF
AUDIT
SAMPLING
MODELS
AND
OPTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING CALIFORNIA’S MANUAL COUNT (2007), assisted the Secretary of
State in crafting revised audit standards as a cure for problematic voting systems. Post-Election
Manual Tally Regulations [expired], CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/pemt.htm (last visited May. 10, 2012).
Computer scientists Ron Rivest (of MIT) and John Wack (of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)), collaboratively originated the concept of “software
independence” as part of the NIST-EAC-TGDC effort to develop improved voting systems
technical standards. See Ronald L. Rivest & John P. Wack, On The Notion of “Software
Independence”
In
Voting
Systems
(draft
July
28,
2006),http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/366/1881/3759.full.pdf+html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012); see also Ronald L. Rivest, On The Notion Of ‘Software Independence’ In Voting
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They join others in recommending robust post-election auditing of
contemporaneously voter-verified paper ballots as the only feasible
way currently available for protecting the election results from
tampering and from random miscounts, whether caused by software
bugs or other human error. Auditing voter-verified paper ballots can
be designed to protect ballot secrecy and yet also provide an effective
check on potentially arbitrary or contrived software totals. While the
paper ballot record is vulnerable to the classic stratagems that include
disappearance, substitution by falsified ballots, or spoilage, a
documented chain of custody combined with a random audit
conducted by appropriate statistical parameters can supply the needed
check and deterrence.157
Given that a statistically sound post-election audit of paper ballot
voting records can ascertain whether the voting system has counted
ballots correctly, and if not, permit a recount, by utilizing this
methodology voting rights can be feasibly protected from becoming
as insubstantial as electronic pulses. Additionally, because this tool
permits humans effectively to “see” inside the machine counts and
thus determine whether the count is correct, arguably a substantive
due process claim should be actionable where state governments have
not adopted auditing processes yet deploy these highly flawed
technologies that produce arbitrary vote counts.
When faced with evidence similar to that provided in the TTBR
and EVEREST, Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled that the
electronic vote recording and tabulation systems that were used for
electing the Bundestag (national legislature) violated fundamental,
systemic protections of democracy and the German citizens’ rights to
popular sovereignty. The court ruled that the e-voting equipment
authorized by the German executive and legislative branches was
unconstitutional after evaluating the critical role of public
transparency and verification of electoral tallies in assuring
democratic legitimacy. 158

Systems, 366 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. A. 3759–3767 (2008) (explaining its use as remedy for
errors endemic to computer-based elections systems).
157 See id. passim.
158 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of the Second Senate of 3 March 2009 on the
Basis
of
the
Oral
Hearing
of
28
October
2008
(Mar.
2009),
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20090303_2bvc000307en.html (invalidating the evoting equipment used in Bundestag elections and holding that public transparency into vote
counting processes is constitutionally required). All textual references are drawn from the
opinion’s paragraphs 109bb–130cc; see also, Press Release, Federal Constitutional Court-Press
office, Use of Voting Computers in 2005 Bundestag Election Unconstitutional (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html; Denise Demirel
et al., Feasibility Analysis of Prêt `a Voter for German Federal Elections (2011),
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An election procedure in which the voter cannot reliably
comprehend whether his or her vote is unfalsifiably recorded
and included in the ascertainment of the election result, and
how the total votes cast are assigned and counted, excludes
central elements of the election procedure from public
monitoring, and hence does not comply with the
constitutional requirements. 159
The court rejected as constitutionally insufficient the capacity for
expert opinion to pronounce whether the counts were accurate or the
software was correct rather than subjected to tampering. The court
stressed “the voter himself or herself must be able to verify . . .
without a more detailed knowledge of computers.” 160
Additionally, the Constitutional Court held that even when the
voter is informed by an electronic display of the fact that his vote has
been registered, constitutionally required transparency and
verification have not been achieved. It pervasively emphasized the
critical role of public transparency and verification to the “democratic
legitimacy of the elections,” so that “manipulation and unauthorized
suspicion can be refuted.” 161 The court reasoned, “Only if the
electorate can reliably convince itself of the lawfulness of the transfer
act . . . before the eyes of the public” can the prerequisites of
democratic legitimacy be assured. 162 “Every citizen must be able to
understand the key steps of the election without any technical
knowledge” so they will respect the announced electoral results. This
constitutionally transparency includes the counting of votes.
An electoral process, in which the voter cannot understand
with certainty whether his vote is recorded unaltered, and has
been included in the counting of votes, nor how the total
votes cast have been accumulated and counted, excludes
central components of assured public verification. [It is
therefore] unable to satisfy the constitutional requirements. 163

http://www.ip.ethz.ch/education/techpolicy_series/schedule/Ryan_2a.pdf (pointing out that the
court did not invalidate per se e-voting systems but reserved whether any such system could
meet public transparency and verification requirements).
159 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of the Second Senate of 3 March 2009 on the
Basis of the Oral Hearing of 28 October 2008 ¶ 113 (Mar. 2009),
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20090303_2bvc000307en.html.
160 Id. at ¶ 121.
161 Id. at ¶ 109.
162 Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
163 Id.
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Thus, Germany’s Constitutional Court has realistically faced the
challenges of new information technologies to the constitutional
rights of its people and its legitimacy as a democratic republic. It has
required evidence-based, publicly transparent and verifiable elections
rather than permit executive and legislative exhortation that its
citizenry should trust in new technologies that have been proved
capable of inaccuracy and covert manipulation. The German court has
articulated clear principles of constitutional law, well-fashioned for
the new threats posed to contemporary democracy by seemingly
benign information technologies. The critical question facing U.S.
citizens is whether our courts will courageously rule in a scientifically
sound manner to protect popular sovereignty when they face the
impending questions concerning the constitutional sufficiency of the
currently deployed electronic voting technologies. 164
CONCLUSION
The national effort to upgrade voting technology and thus protect
the right to vote has produced laudable improvements in the residual
vote rate and more modestly in accessibility for disabled voters. But
given the definitive voting technology assessments that issued in
2007, corrective responses are overdue. Where fundamental rights are
concerned, governments are required to exercise special protective
care. That high standard has been met by neither those state
governments who continue to deploy all-electronic DRE voting
systems, nor by most states that use electronic scanners. While
litigation is not a first choice for resolving the impasse between
advocates of recountable elections and government officers, the
persistent misunderstandings regarding the gravity of the scientific
findings may leave no alternatives but litigation.
More than ever, election policymakers and administrators need
sufficient computer security training styled for their sensitive jobs so
indicators of dangerous malfunctions that might affect vote totals will
be understood and prompt effective remedial action. Given the grave
cyber threats all governmental and private sector information systems
are facing, the nation and its courts must confront the harsh realities
about e-voting technology’s failures thus far. Election law scholars
must grapple with these realities as well to point the way forward for
164 Cases pending currently include Banfield v. Aichele, Appeal of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Docket No. 442 M.D. 2006 (2011) (challenging the Pennsylvania
constitutionality of the DRE voting systems that lack a paper audit trail); and Gusciora v.
Christie, Docket No. A–005608–10T3 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 2011) (challenging the New Jersey state
constitutionality of the DRE voting systems that lack a paper audit trail).
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protecting constitutional voting rights from well-intended but
misunderstood technical innovations. 165

165 Information system technologies pose a broad array of risks to constitutional rights and
values. See generally CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffrey
Rosen & Benjamin Wittes, eds. 2011) (exploring the impact of new technologies on privacy,
identity, freedom from self-incrimination, genetic information, and other values). Election
technologies could provide a prime example, but again, were sidestepped by major legal
scholars.
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